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ECOLOGY, TRADE AND STATES IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. I test Bates’ view that trade across ecological divides promoted the develop-
ment of states in pre-colonial Africa. My main result is that sub-Saharan societies in
ecologically diverse environments had more centralized pre-colonial states. I use spa-
tial variation in rainfall to control for possible endogeneity. I construct artificial societies
and present narrative evidence to show the results are not due to conquest of trading re-
gions. I also test mechanisms by which trade may have caused states, and find that trade
supported class stratification between rulers and ruled.
1. INTRODUCTION
The states that existed in Africa before colonial rule continue to shape its modern de-
velopment. Pre-colonial state centralization is positively correlated with modern cross-
country differences in school attainment, literacy, paved roads and immunizations (Gen-
naioli and Rainer, 2007). It better predicts nighttime lights today than country-level
institutional quality (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2010). The few modern states
in Africa that inherited the legitimacy of a pre-colonial predecessor have done better
(Englebert, 2000). The parts of French West Africa with stronger indigenous states bet-
ter resisted French settlement, but received less investment during the colonial period
(Huillery, 2011). These recent empirical findings are in line with those of historians
and political scientists, who have argued that alien rulers had to take African systems
as given and build upon them during the colonial period (Austin, 2008b; Berry, 1992;
Mamdani, 1996). Economists have similarly found that the long historical roots of mod-
ern states are relevant for modern development beyond Africa (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005;
Bockstette et al., 2002; Iyer, 2010). Explaining pre-colonial states, then, is necessary for
understanding modern Africa.
In this paper, I test a “Ricardian” view of sub-Saharan states presented by Bates (1983),
in his Essays on the political economy of rural Africa. He builds on earlier arguments
made by Oliver and Fage (1962) and Vansina (1966), among others, who argued that
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long-distance trade required centralized authorities for administrative purposes, dif-
fused concepts of centralized polities, and stimulated territorial expansion (Bisson, 1982).
His model is verbal:
One of the basic arguments linking political centralization with economic
reward rests upon the desire of people to benefit from the gains in welfare
which can be reaped from markets. In essence, the argument is Ricar-
dian... the contribution of the state is to provide order and peace and
thereby to render production and exchange possible for members of so-
ciety. The origins of the state, then, lie in the welfare gains that can be
reaped through the promotion of markets.
He suggests that gains from trade are greatest where products from one ecological zone
can be traded for products from another. It is near ecological divides, then, that we
should expect to see states. To support his view, he takes 34 pre-colonial African so-
cieties, asks whether they “abut an ecological divide,” and classifies them as having a
“kinship” political structure, “chiefs,” or “central monarchs.” I present a condensed ver-
sion of his results in the appendix. The proportion of societies with central monarchs is
greater on an ecological divide.
In this paper, I argue that Bates (1983) is ultimately correct. His argument has been
overlooked because his sample size prevents him making a credible econometric argu-
ment that this correlation is causal. In this paper, I use ethnographic and geographic
data to overcome this limitation. I take data on state centralization for 440 societies
in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. Merg-
ing the map of African ethnic groups from Murdock (1959) with information on African
ecological zones from White (1983), I am able to compute for each society an index of
its “ecological diversity,” which I take as a proxy for the gains from trade that existed
before colonial rule. I show that this index is strongly related to the presence of pre-
colonial states. For example, within what the Atlas calls the “Equatorial Bantu,” the
Luba score .69 on the diversity index and 3 out of 4 on the centralization index. The
Kela and Ndonko, by contrast, have no diversity and no centralization. On the “Guinea
Coast,” the Yoruba score 3 on centralization and .58 on diversity, while the Yako score
zero on both.
I use spatial variation in rainfall to control for possible reverse causation, and show
that the OLS estimates of the impact of ecological diversity are not overstated. I also use
exogenous geographic features to predict raster-level ecological regions, and find that
the diversity measured by these predicted points is also related to pre-colonial African
states. The relationship between trade and states is robust to several additional con-
trols, removing influential observations, alternative measures of states and trade, and a
variety of estimation strategies.
I show that the “Ricardian” view better explains the relationship between states and
diverse ecology than six alternative stories. First, while larger territories may require
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more levels of administration and may be more diverse, area does not explain away the
relationship between ecological diversity and states, and the results hold within artifi-
cial countries of a uniform shape and size. Second, because panel data are not available
for these ethnic groups, I am not able to conclusively show that societies that indepen-
dently developed state centralization did not migrate to capture the regions in which
the gains from trade were high. In order to argue that this does not explain my results,
I present narrative evidence on the histories of the most influential observations in the
data and note again that geographic area (that is, territorial expansion) does not explain
away the results. By adding additional controls, I am able to show that two other stories
– dense population in diverse regions and defense of “islands” of land quality – do not
explain away the relationship between trade and states. Fifth, I show that the diversity
of grains available for cultivation do not do away with the main results, and so these are
not due to the diversity of activities made available by the environment. Sixth, while
diverse areas are more ethnically fractionalized, ecology directly impacts states even
when this is included in the sample of artificial countries. Inter-ethnic competition,
then, does not explain away my findings. I test for several mechanisms by which trade
may have facilitated state centralization, and find that class stratification is the channel
best supported by the data. No one type of trade is shown to be most important.
The Ricardian view is only one of many theories of the long-run geographic origins
of strong states. It is not my aim to test the Ricardian view against these except insofar
as they may also explain the observed link between states and ecological diversity. Di-
amond (1997) argues that Eurasian endowments of domesticable plants and animals,
combined with an East-West orientation that facilitated their diffusion, gave that land-
mass an early advantage over the Americas and Africa. Jones (2003) makes an argument
for Europe that is remarkably similar to the Ricardian view, stating that:
In Europe’s case, the most relevant aspect of the resource endowment was
probably the way it was dispersed across a geologically and climatically
varied continent, since this provided an inducement to trade (p. xxxii).
Specifically, he suggests that the gains from bulk, low value trade encouraged rulers to
gain their revenues through taxation of protected trade, rather than the arbitrary con-
fiscations that would be possible with trade in luxuries (p. 89). Olson (1993), by con-
trast, suggests that above the level of hunter-gatherers, most societies have some ves-
tige of a state because it is in the interests of “roving” bandits to establish themselves as
ruling “stationary” bandits and encourage economic activity that they can tax. In this
light, my study highlights a geographic circumstance that makes this possible through
trade. States are only one of many imperfect ways to govern the market (Dixit, 2004),
and this study then draws attention to one condition under which they emerge. There
are also reasons why we might expect ecological homogeneity to facilitate trade and
states. Societies that can only produce a narrow range of goods may be compelled to
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trade. Moav and Mayshar (2011) suggest that the homogeneity of ancient Egypt bene-
fitted that state’s centralization, compared with Israel and Babylon. Because all farmers
depended on the Nile flood, which could be easily monitored, the state was uniquely
able to tax them effectively. My study shows, then, that the impacts of diversity on trade
outweigh these competing effects on average.
Similarly, this Ricardian view of the origins of pre-colonial African states contrasts
with other, though not necessarily rival, theories of African political centralization. Again,
it is not the purpose of this paper to test between these hypotheses unless they are alter-
native explanations of the relationship between ecological diversity and states. First, the
“land-abundance” view of Africa argues that the relative absence of large states in pre-
colonial Africa was the result of sparse population (Austin, 2008a; Herbst, 2000). Unable
to tax land, which had little value, African states had to rely on trade taxes for revenue.
This is to be understood in contrast with the view of Tilly and Ardant (1975), who ar-
gue that it was the need to secure and defend territory that gave rise to modern nation
states in Europe. I show in this paper that, even controlling for population density, gains
from trade allowed states to exist in Africa. Second, contributions by Nunn (2008) and
Robinson (2002) have built on older views, such as those of Rodney (1972), and argued
that the slave trade and colonial rule undermined institutional development in Africa,
including state centralization. I show that the relationship between states and ecology
is robust to measures of access to the transatlantic slave trade.
In the remainder of this paper, I proceed as follows. In section 2, I describe my sources
of data, how I measure state centralization, and how I compute ecological diversity for
each society. In section 3, I outline the principal econometric specification and the
baseline results. In section 4, I demonstrate the robustness of these results to endogene-
ity, unobserved heterogeneity, the estimation strategy, influential observations, and al-
ternative measures of trade and states. In section 5, I give evidence that the six alterna-
tive stories mentioned above do not explain the results. In section 6, I present suggestive
evidence that centralized states emerged from trade because it supported class differ-
entiation, and that no one type of trade mattered most. In section 7, I conclude.
2. DATA
In order to test the Ricardian theory of African states empirically, I need data on three
things – African states, the gains from trade, and other variables whose omission could
potentially bias the results. In this section I describe my sources of for each.
To measure African states, I take data from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. This
was originally published in 29 issues of Ethnology between 1962 and 1980. It contains
data on 1267 societies from around the world.1 From this source, I use variable 33, “Ju-
risdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community” to measure state centralization. This
1In particular, I use the revised Atlas posted online by J. Patrick Gray at
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/˜drwhite/worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav.
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gives a discrete categorization between “No Levels” and “Four Levels.” This is the same
variable that was used by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010), and originally con-
verted by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) into a discrete variable to capture the same con-
cept.2 The sample used for the analysis consists of the 440 sub-Saharan societies, in-
cluding Madagascar, for which this variable is not missing. I map this measure of state
centralization on Murdock’s (1959) ethnic map of Africa in Figure 1.3 For comparison
with Europe and Asia, the Chekiang and Japanese score a 4 on this index, the Czechs
and the Dutch score a 3, while the Lolo and Lapps each have no state centralization.
To measure the gains from trade, I follow Bates (1983) in assuming that the ability
to trade across ecological zones will be particularly beneficial. To get information on
ecology, I use White’s (1983) vegetation map of Africa.4 This classifies African vegetation
into 17 major types, which I plot in Figure 2.5
To construct a measure of how location relative to these regions could give rise to
gains from trade, I calculate the share sti of each society i’s area that is occupied by each
ecological type t. Then, I use a Herfindahl index to construct a measure of each society’s
ecological diversity:
(1) Ecological diversityi = 1−
t=17∑
t=1
(sti)
2.
The economic analogy for this measure is that, if ethnic groups were markets, vegeta-
tion types were firms and these area shares were market shares, this would be an index
of the competitiveness of the market. As more ecological zones intersect a society’s area,
the natural ability to trade increases, and the index rises. I show a map of this variable
in Figure 2. Visually comparing Figures 1 and 2, it is apparent that the most centralized
African states are clustered along an East-West line between the Sahara desert and West
African forest zone, in the diverse microclimates of the Ethiopian highlands, along the
barrier between the equatorial rainforest and the East and Central African woodland
mosaics, and on the divide between grassland and woodland in the continent’s south-
eastern corner. In section 4, I show that distance from an ecological divide performs
2In particular, they took a society as “centralized” if it had at least one level of jurisdiction above the local,
and weighted this by each society’s share in the national population in 1960 to construct a country-level
measure of pre-colonial state centralization in Africa.
3This map is available on Nathan Nunn’s website. While most ethnic groups can be matched to this map
directly by name, some require an alternative spelling, an alternative name, linkage to a supergroup, or
subgroup, or joining to an ethnic group in roughly the same location. A table of these matches is included
in the web appendix.
4This is available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/data/download/gnv031.zip.
5Altimontaine, anthropic, azonal, bushland and thicket, bushland and thicket mosaic, cape shrubland,
desert, edaphic grassland mosaic, forest, forest transition and mosaic, grassland, grassy shrubland, sec-
ondary wooded grassland, semi-desert, traditional scrubland, woodland, woodland mosaics and transi-
tions.
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as well as this index at predicting states, as does an alternative index created from in-
dependent FAO data. Summary statistics for the main measures of states and trade, as
well as alternatives that will be explained later in the paper, are included in Table 1.
It is possible that, even if there is a strong correlation between ecological diversity and
state centralization, this is due to omitted variables correlated with the diversity index.
I am able to join several other geographic variables to the data on ecology and states
using the Murdock (1959) map of Africa. Except where I note otherwise, I take data
stored in raster format, and for each society I compute the average value of the points
within its territory.6 In particular, I control for the presence of a major river, agricultural
constraints (an inverse measure of land quality), distance from the coast, elevation, suit-
ability for malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, distance from Lake Victoria,
date of observation, crop type dummies, and distance from each of the four major slave
trades. These variables are described in more detail in the appendix.
Summary statistics for these controls and any other variables used in the later anal-
ysis are given in Table 1. It is clear that the greatest difficulty with these data are that
they are anachronistic – the institutional variables are recorded at an earlier date than
the geographic controls and the measure of ecological diversity. Insofar as broad dif-
ferences across regions in their capacities for rainfed agriculture, terrain ruggedness,
ecological regions and similar variables do not change much over time, this should only
add measurement error to the analysis. It is possible, however, that states transform
their environments in ways that non-state societies cannot. I use both instrumental
variables and non-anthropogenic predictors of ecological types in Section 4 to address
this concern.
3. RESULTS
Before undertaking econometric tests, it is worth investigating whether there is a visi-
ble unconditional relationship between the ecological measure of gains from trade and
state centralization. Because centralization is a discrete variable, a scatter plot will not
present the data clearly. Instead, in Figure 3, I cut the sample into two – societies above
and below the median in terms of ecological diversity. For each, I show a histogram of
the relative frequencies of states of each level of centralization. It is clear that, below the
median (the lighter bars), it is more common for societies to have no levels jurisdiction
above the local, or one level. Above the median, there is a greater concentration of so-
cieties with two or three levels of jurisdiction. Both above and below the median, it is
quite uncommon for societies to have four such levels. The general pattern is clear; as
ecological variation rises, the distribution of state centralization skews to the right.
6Raster data taken from the following sources: Ag. Constraints, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/
LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 28; Elevation, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/; Malaria, http://www.
mara.org.za/lite/download.htm; Precipitation, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.
html, plate 1; Temperature, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 6; Rugged-
ness, http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
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To test econometrically whether there the gains from trade due to ecological diversity
predict the existence of centralized states in pre-colonial Africa, I estimate the following
using an ordered probit:
(2) State centralizationi = α + βEcological diversityi + x
′
iγ + i.
In (2), state centralization is the number of levels of jurisdiction recorded by the Ethno-
graphic Atlas. Ecological diversity is the index defined above. The vector xi includes the
other controls reported listed in section 2. Standard errors are clustered by the thirteen
ethnographic regions recorded in the sample.7
Table 2 presents the resulting estimates of β. I report the full set of coefficient esti-
mates in the appendix, omitting them in the text for space. In column 1, only the mea-
sure of ecological diversity is included. Ecological diversity has a significant and positive
correlation with state centralization. This is robust to the inclusion of additional con-
trols in column 2, and the coefficient does not fall by much.
Surprisingly, few of the additional controls are statistically significant. The exceptions
are date of observation (negative), no major crop (negative), roots and tubers (positive),
and major river (positive). The negative effect of the date of observation likely suggests
that colonial-era anthropologists chose to first study the least remote and most central-
ized African societies – the low hanging academic fruit. The negative effect of no major
crop suggests that it is difficult to form a state without an agrarian base of any sort. The
positive effect of roots and tubers is a surprise, and is likely proxying for unobservable
features of forest-zone Bantu societies that better enabled them to create states. Major
rivers are associated with trade, and further suggest that the Ricardian view of African
states is largely correct. Results are similar if the length of river per unit area is used,
rather than a dummy (not reported).
Is the effect of ecological diversity large? In Table 2, I report the marginal effects of
ecological diversity for both specifications. The marginal effect of a one unit change in
ecological diversity is to reduce the probability of having no levels of jurisdiction above
the local by roughly 22-26 percentage points; the probabilities of having two or three
levels increase to match this, though the effect is slightly stronger for three levels. A one
unit change corresponds with a move of roughly four standard deviations in the ecologi-
cal diversity measure. At a first glance, this would appear to suggest that the effect, while
statistically significant, is small. However, ecological diversity has a very clearly bimodal
distribution (see Figure 4). A move from one peak at zero to the other peak, at roughly
0.5, better captures the comparison between “diverse” and homogenous societies. This
would suggest, then, that were a society to be taken from an ecologically homogenous
region and placed in one that was typically diverse, the probability of having some form
7These are: African Hunters, South African Bantu, Central Bantu, Northeast Bantu, Equatorial Bantu,
Guinea Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Eastern Sudan, Upper Nile, Ethiopia/Horn, Moslem Su-
dan, and Indian Ocean.
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of state centralization would rise very roughly between 11 and 13 percentage points. If
the ecological diversity measure is replaced with an indicator for being above median
diversity, which may better capture this conceptual change from homogeneous to typi-
cally diverse ecology, the marginal effects (also reported in the bottom panel of Table 2)
are similar, and between 9 and 11 percentage points.
4. ROBUSTNESS
4.1. Validity of the state centralization measure. The measure of state centralization
I use is far from ideal. One deficiency is that weak but pyramidal states will appear to
be centralized in this data. The Bemba, as an example, have two levels of jurisdiction
above the local. I would like to replicate these results with alternative measures of state
strength. I am not, however, aware of any similar measure available for more than a
small sub-sample of the ethnic groups in my data. Instead, I take two other approaches
to validate the state centralization measure.
First, I show that it is strongly correlated with other measures of states for which I
have data in other samples. Bockstette et al. (2002) and Chanda and Putterman (2007)
construct indices of “state antiquity” for modern countries that reflect, in a given fifty
year period, a) the existence of a government, b) the proportion of the modern coun-
try’s territory covered, and c) whether the state was indigenous or externally imposed. I
take this measure for the period 1850-1900 as a measure of state strength from roughly
the same period as the centralization index. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) aggregate the
state centralization index to the country level using ethnic groups’ population shares
reported in the Atlas Narodov Mira. For 41 countries, I have both of the antiquity and
centralization measures. Regressing nineteenth century states on country-level central-
ization and a constant gives a coefficient estimate of 15.096 and a standard error is 4.970
– the two are strongly related.
Similarly, the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS) is a sub-sample of 186 soci-
eties recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas for which much larger number of variables
are available. I have not used these in the present study, since only 28 societies in the
SCCS from sub-Saharan Africa. I can, however, show that the centralization measure
I use is strongly correlated with the other measures of states coded in the SCCS.8 For
nearly thirty variables from the SCCS that capture ordinal measures of various aspects
of state strength, I regress the variable on my measure of state centralization and report
the results in the appendix. All of these are significantly related to state centralization,
whether they measure the existence of a police force, the presence of taxation, or the
capacity of states to enforce their decrees. The measure used in this study, then, is a
valid proxy for state strength.
Second, I recode the state centralization measure into a dummy that equals one if
the society has any levels of jurisdiction above the local. This may better capture state
8The centralization measure is v237 in the SCCS.
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strength if, for example, it is impossible for a central authority to delegate administrative
functions to regional leaders without also losing some control over them. I show in Table
3 that this measure is also positively related to ecological diversity. Results are similar if
I use centralization greater than one as a binary outcome.
4.2. Validity of the gains from trade measure. While ecological variation captures to
some degree the presence of gains from trade, it is not clear that it is the best measure
available. Bates (1983) divides societies into those that abut a divide, those that are di-
verse, and those that have no significant variation. As an alternative measure of the
gains from trade, I use the White (1983) map to compute the average distance (in deci-
mal degrees) of all points in a group’s territory from the nearest boundary between two
ecological regions. I present the results in Table 3. The statistical robustness of these
results is stronger than the results obtained using ecological diversity. Results using a
binary indicator for whether the society is diverse at all (equivalent to whether it is inter-
sected by a divide) are similar. Because some of the ecological types recorded in White’s
map are alike, potentially leading to over-estimation of ecological diversity, I collapse
these classifications into eight “simpler” types.9 Results are again similar. Simplifying
the classes in this manner does not do away with the sharply bi-modal distribution of
diversity. Finally, I re-build the data-set discarding any slices of map in which historical
population density in 1960, a proxy for historical population density, is less than 15%
of the density of the ethnic group as a whole. The results are robust to excluding these
areas, and so regions that are possibly irrelevant due to low population are not driving
the results.
In addition, the FAO-GAEZ project created its own separate classification of ecologi-
cal zones that can be used to construct an alternative diversity measure.10 This source
categorizes raster points in Africa into eleven “dominant ecosystem classes.”11 For each
ethnic group in the data, I construct a measure analogous to that in (1) using the share
of raster points for each ecosystem class, rather than the share of area. Results using this
alternative measure of ecological diversity are presented in Table 3. As with the distance
from an ecological divide, the coefficient estimates here are more statistically robust
than main results.
4.3. Validity of the estimation. There are many possible reasons the approach taken
to the estimation may be questioned. First, the “parallel regression” assumption of the
9Mountain if altimontane, other if anthropic, water or azonal, bushland if bushland and thicket or bush-
land and thicket mosaics, shrub if cape shrubland, transitional scrubland or grassy shrubland, desert if
desert or semi-desert, grassland if grassland, secondary wooded grassland or edaphic grassland mosaics,
forest if forest or forest transitions and mosaics, and woodland if woodland or woodland mosaics and
transitions.
10This is plate 55, downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm.
11These are Undefined; Grassland; Woodland; Forest; Mosaics including crops; Cropland; Intensive crop-
land; Wetlands; Desert, bare land; Water and coastal fringes; Ice, cold desert, tundra; and Urban agglom-
erates.
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standard ordered probit model, that the explanatory variables have the same impact on
the latent index at all points, is often violated in real data. In Table 4, I re-estimate the
main results using a generalized ordered probit model (Maddala, 1986), in which the
coefficients on the latent variables are allowed to vary across the cutoff points of the
latent variable. Convergence could not be achieved with ruggedness or Red Sea slave
trade distance included, so these are dropped as controls. As before, ecological diversity
predicts greater state centralization. Here, it is clear that this effect is not confined to any
single level of centralization. Excepting at four levels, for which few observations exist,
the effect is positive throughout.
Because the unit of observation is the ethnic group, rather than the political unit, it is
a potential worry that multi-ethnic polities will lead to an over-counting of centralized
societies in the data. If, however, I downweight all societies with centralization greater
than zero by one half or one third, the results are virtually unchanged (not reported).
Finally, the inclusion of the major river dummy and distances from the coast, Lake Vic-
toria, and slave trade ports may be capturing elements of trade based on features other
than ecological diversity. Similarly, while the inclusion of the date of observation is in-
tended to control for both remoteness and the possible impacts of European influence,
it may be endogenous to state centralization. I show in Table 4 that excluding these
variables barely affects the results.
It is also possible that the results here are driven by outliers. In Table 5, I control for
this possibility by dropping influential observations from the sample. I estimate the
main results by OLS with the full set of controls. I then compute the leverage and dfbeta
(for ecological diversity) statistics for each observation. In column 1 of Table 5, I drop all
observations with leverage greater than 2(df + 2)/N . In column 2, I remove any obser-
vations with absolute dfbeta greater than 2/
√
N . The main result survives both of these
procedures.
It is also possible that the results are spuriously identified by variation within a sin-
gle African region. In columns 3 through 6, I drop each of the “South African bantu,”
“Ethiopia/horn,” ‘Moslem sudan” and “Indian Ocean” in turn. These are the regions in
which most states are concentrated. The results again are robust to each of these. It
is not the contrast between a handful of states and their neighbors that is driving the
results. I also show in this table that the results are not driven by the presence of non-
agricultural societies, animal husbandry, or the desert fringe in the data. I drop the 10%
of the sample with the greatest constraints on agriculture, in the event that the results
are driven by societies that have nothing of value to produce. The main results remain.
4.4. Possible reverse causation. It is also possible that stronger states shape the en-
vironment; McCann (1999) describes, for example, the careful regulation of forest re-
sources in Ethiopia before the twentieth century. To control for this, I employ the stan-
dard deviation of temperature across space (not across time) within an ethnic group’s
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territory as an instrument for its ecological diversity.12 This is intended to capture a
source of variation in ecological conditions that is beyond human control, and which
gives rise to differences in vegetation. The disadvantage of this instrument is that it
cannot be computed for societies so small that they have only one raster point for tem-
perature, or whose temperature measure was imputed from a nearest neighbor.
I present the results in Table 6. In column 1, I replicate the main results from Table 2
using OLS, for comparability with the other columns. In column 2, I repeat the analysis,
but restrict the sample to societies for which the instrument is available. The coeffi-
cient estimates are roughly similar, suggesting that selection into non-missing observa-
tions of temperature variance will not drive the results. In columns 3 and 4, I present
the IV results. I also present the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange multiplier and F statistics.
While these are less statistically robust than the OLS results, the coefficients grow larger.
Including any one of elevation, temperature, ruggedness or distance from the Indian
Ocean slave trade causes the IV results to become insignificant. There is no evidence
that the ordered probit estimates overstate the effect of ecological diversity on state cen-
tralization. This argument is analogous to that made by Frankel and Romer (1999), who
instrument for trade openness using using geographical features in a cross-country set-
ting and find that, while their effects are statistically insignificant, there is no evidence
that OLS overstates the causal effect of trade on growth.
I am also able to use the FAO classifications to construct an alternative measure of
ecological diversity that is not endogenous to human action. For each of the 365,788
raster points in that data, I regress an indicator for each of the eleven ecosystem classes
on deciles in latitude, longitude, average precipitation, distance from the coast, accu-
mulated temperatures above five and ten degrees, ruggedness, length of the growing
period, and terrain slope, as well as dummies for each type of thermal growing period,
frost-free period, and soil class.13 From each of these linear regressions, I take the linear
prediction as the probability that the raster point falls into that ecosystem type. I take
the most probable class as the predicted type, and I am able to correctly predict a bit
more than 70% of the raster points by this method. I re-calculate the diversity index us-
ing these predicted types. The results using this as a diversity measure are presented in
Table 6. I continue to find that this predicts state centralization. This degree of robust-
ness is surprising; because this method is particularly bad at predicting raster points
in the less common ecological types, it under-predicts ecological diversity. This further
suggests the main results are not due to strong states transforming their landscapes.
12I do not use variation across time for two reasons. First, it is unlikely to predict ecological diversity,
which is effectively variation across space in vegetation. Second, since fluctuations in temperature may
lead to conflict (e.g. Burke et al. (2009)), it may not be an excludable instrument.
13All of these are downloaded from the FAO-GAEZ website, calculated in ArcMap, or already described
above, except for soil type, which is taken from Zobler’s grouping of the world’s soils into 106 classes such
as “Eutric Cambisoils,” downloaded from the UNEP website. These often differ in resolution from that of
the ecosystem raster, and so the nearest raster point in each plate is used.
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4.5. Possible omitted heterogeneity. As with any cross-sectional analysis, one of the
most pernicious concerns is that the results are driven by unobservables that happen
to be correlated with the causal variable of interest – in this case ecological diversity.
While I have included an index of ecological diversity constructed from the area shares
sti of each ecological type for each ethnic group, I have not generally controlled for these
directly. This is primarily for statistical power. These may, however, be significant de-
terminants of states and correlated with ecological diversity. In Table 7, I add these as
additional controls. The estimated effect of diversity is now larger, and more statistically
robust.
In the top panel of Table 7, I include a cubic in latitude and longitude with full in-
teractions, which allow unobservables to vary smoothly across space. The results are
robust to including this. I also account for omitted heterogeneity by re-estimating the
main results using a spatial error model. This replaces the vector of errors in (2) with
a spatially-weighted vector λW, and a vector of iid errors, u. W is a row-normalized
spatial weights matrix. I select W so that all societies whose centroids are within ten
decimal degrees of each other are given a weight inversely proportionate to their dis-
tance from each other. I report the results in Table 7.14 The effect of ecological diversity
remains statistically significant, though the estimated coefficients are smaller than in
Table 6. Once additional controls are added, I find no evidence that λ is statistically sig-
nificant. This may be because neighbors’ observables fully explain correlations in states
across space. I next add the observable X of each society’s neighbors, weighted by the
matrix W . While these are strongly significant – neighbors’ characteristics matter – a
Moran’s I test conducted on the residuals suggests that there is no spatial correlation
conditional on these. Results are similar if I use a spatial lag model, or if I use Conley’s
OLS with standard errors corrected for spatial dependence and cutoffs of 1,000.
In Section 5, I attempt to deal with specific unobservables that are related to alterna-
tive interpretations of the data. Here, I take four more general approaches to deal with
unobservables. First, I use the strategy suggested by Wooldridge (2002) for testing ro-
bustness to unobserved heterogeneity. I de-mean all of the standard controls included
in Table 2, and interact them with my ecological diversity measure. A similar approach
is used by Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010), for example. Results are reported in Table 7. I
find that, while some of these interactions are significant, they do little to diminish the
main result, suggesting that it cannot be explained away by heterogeneous treatment
effects once controls are added.
Second, I employ a nearest neighbor matching estimator in order to shift the bulk
of identifying variation to those observations that are most similar along their observ-
ables.15 Because these estimators consider a binary “treatment,” I divide the sample
into observations above and below the median in ecological diversity. Results are given
14In particular, I use the spatwmat and spatreg commands in Stata.
15In particular, I use the nnmatch command in Stata.
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in Table 7. If observations are matched using their observable controls, the difference in
state centralization between “treated” and “untreated” societies (the average treatment
effect) remains statistically significant and is similar in magnitude to the comparable
regression in Table 2.
Third, I compute Altonji-Elder-Taber statistics. Replicating the main regression us-
ing OLS, I obtain the estimated coefficient on ecological diversity βˆ1 and the estimated
variance of the residuals Vˆ1. Regressing state centralization on the controls, I obtain the
predicted values xb and the estimated variance of the residuals Vˆ2. Regressing ecologi-
cal diversity on xb, I obtain the coefficient estimate βˆ2. Altonji et al. (2005) suggest that
if βˆ1Vˆ2
βˆ2Vˆ1
> 1, it is unlikely that unobservables will explain away the result of interest. The
estimates reported do not support selection on the unobservables.
Finally, I use a variety of regional fixed effects to control for heterogeneity, beginning
in column 10 with dummies for each ethnographic region. While regional dummies do
knock away some of the magnitude of the coefficient estimate, it remains significant at
the 10% level. This fall in magnitude is not surprising; in an OLS regression, the region
dummies explain 19% of the variance in state centralization and 25% of the variance
in ecological diversity. From Figure 2, it is apparent that ecological zones are largely
macro-regional.
In column 11 I add fixed effects for the United Nations’ division of Africa into regions
– Southern Africa (African Hunters, South African Bantu), Western Africa (Guinea Coast,
Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Moslem Sudan), Central Africa (Central Bantu, Equa-
torial Bantu, Eastern Sudan) and Eastern Africa (Northeast Bantu, Upper Nile, Ethiopia
and Horn, Indian Ocean). The coefficient estimate falls less with the addition of these
broader fixed effects than with fixed effects added for the regions. In column 12, I add
fixed effects for the country into which the largest slice of each ethnic group’s terri-
tory falls. This dispels any concern that the relationship between diversity and states is
driven by the biases of colonial-era anthropologists originating from any colonial power.
In column 13, I add language family dummies. These are unique identifiers constructed
from variables 98 and 99 in the Ethnographic Atlas. These divide the sample into 20
groups such as “Niger-Congo: Eastern or Adamawa-Eastern”. The results are again ro-
bust.
5. ALTERNATIVE STORIES
The results presented so far are not, however, completely dispositive. They are con-
sistent with at least six alternative stories of the relationship between ecology, trade and
states in pre-colonial Africa. In the remainder of this section, I give evidence that the
Ricardian view of African states better fits the data.
5.1. Larger areas are more diverse and require more centralized administration. It
is possible that, if administering a larger area requires more levels of administration,
states that happen to cover greater territories for reasons unrelated to their strength will
14 JAMES FENSKE
appear more centralized in the data. Further, larger areas may be mechanically more
likely to be ecologically diverse. Conversely, there is the “territorial expansion model”
of Spencer (1998, 2010), who argues that the delegation of administrative authority to
regional units is a ruler’s rational response to territorial expansion. Again, this could
create a link between diversity and states that operates through the geographic scope of
a society, and not through trade.
I have three strategies for dismissing this alternative explanation of my results. The
first is to adopt the “virtual countries” approach of Michalopoulos (2008). I divide the
African continent into squares 1◦ by 1◦ (see Figure 5) and repeat the main analysis. Ex-
cepting coastal societies, the units of observation are of a uniform shape and area.16
Because several ethnic groups might intersect a single square, I keep the levels of ju-
risdiction of the most centralized state as that square’s measure of state centralization;
that society’s crop type, date of observation, and ethnographic region are also kept for
the analysis. Results are presented in Table 8. These are even more statistically robust
than the main results. Similarly, because the unit of observation for the main analysis
is the ethnic group, this approach mitigates the concern that multi-ethnic states will be
“double-counted” in the data. For robustness, I repeat this exercise using the median
state as the square’s measure of centralization, and using squares 2◦ by 2◦, roughly the
same size as the mean ethnic group.17 Results are similar.
Second, I restrict the sample to societies of similar areas. I compute area quintiles
for all ethnic groups. In Table 8, I report the results if the smallest quintile (Q1), largest
quintile (Q5) or both are dropped. Results are robust to this sample restriction, and
the coefficients on ecological diversity are greatest when both the largest and smallest
ethnic groups are removed from the sample. Third, I control for area directly in Table 8
and show that the main effect does not disappear. I discuss this in greater detail below.
5.2. States conquer trading regions. The second alternative explanation of the results
is that states emerge for reasons unrelated to the gains from trade, and then move to
occupy prime trading regions through migration or conquest. I again have three re-
sponses. My first argument against this alternative story is to appeal to the artificial
country results above. That similar results can be achieved using units with regular
boundaries suggests that diversity does not result from the irregularly-shaped bound-
aries of ethnic groups that have conquered their surroundings in ways that overlap
with ecology. My second strategy for dismissing this alternative story is to give nar-
rative evidence on the most influential (in terms of dfbeta) societies in the data. The
top fourteen of these are listed in Table 9. The central argument of this paper is that
trade causes states. If the centralized societies in this list are known to have developed
16Because the length of a degree of longitude varies by distance from the equator, I have also replicated
the results in Table 8 down-weighting observations by the degree of this distortion. The results (not re-
ported) are nearly identical.
17Small variations in sample size occur when the median state is from the “Saharan” or “North African”
ethnographic region, which is then discarded for the analysis.
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states where they are, rather than migrating to capture them, this supports the Ricar-
dian view. Further, if these states derived their wealth and power from their location
relative to geographically-shaped trade routes, it is evidence that profitable trade routes
were necessary for states to exist in these locations. I choose six of the most influential
centralized states for case study evidence.18
It is possible that not all societies are able to take advantage of gains from trade in
order to become states. Groups that look different from their neighbors early on may
expand in response to new trading opportunities not seized by other societies around
them. This need not, on its own, imply rejection of the basic argument that this ex-
pansion was based on trade. What is critical is whether the society would have had the
resources to become a regional power in the absence of revenues and other benefits
coming from this trade.
To test the “Ricardian” view, I ask five questions about the Yoruba, Songhai, Toro,
Suku, Luba and Lozi. First, did these societies participate in trade? Second, was trade
a source of wealth for the society? Third, was trade a source of state power? Fourth,
did these polities rise and fall with the fortunes of external trade? Fifth, did these states
move to capture trading regions after they grew strong? I summarize the answers to
these questions in Table 9. While the evidence does not in every case support the view
that trade promotes states rather than the reverse (especially the answers to the fourth
question), it is broadly consistent with this interpretation.
Yoruba. Morton-Williams (1969) argues that Yoruba Oyo and Akan Ashanti “devel-
oped under the stimulus of external trade, owing much from their beginnings to their
proximity to the Mande trade routes in the north, and later also to their fortunate posi-
tions in the hinterlands during the growth of the maritime markets on the coast.” Law
(1977) is more guarded, suggesting that three factors together explain the rise of Oyo –
the strength of its imported cavalry, its participation in long-distance commerce with
the north, and its engagement in the Atlantic slave trade, the latter being followed by
Oyo’s imperial expansion. It is clear that trade was important in the Oyo economy. Oyo
cloth was sold to Dahomey and Porto Novo, and the state imported kola nuts from the
forest areas of Yorubaland for consumption and re-export. Salt and camwood were im-
ported, and the latter was re-exported to Nupe. The horses on which the Oyo cavalry
depended were also imported from the north, albeit in return for slaves. Critically, Law
(1977) shows that the Alafin (king) relied heavily on trade taxes for his revenues; even
direct taxes were collected in cowries and other currencies that were largely acquired
through trade. Further, he and other chiefs engaged in trade personally. Trade upheld
the authority of the Alafin by permitting him to maintain a superior standard of life, and
by enabling him to distribute money and trade goods. The story that emerges from the
18I choose these, rather than non-centralized societies, because the alternative story being discussed is
specific to centralized ethnic groups and because the secondary historical literature is richer for these
groups. These were the six most influential states when a different measure of ruggedness was used in
the analysis.
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accounts of Morton-Williams (1969) and Law (1977), then, is of a state that depended
on trade across ecological zones for its existence, but was spurred to expand by the rise
of the coastal slave trade. Neither author mentions conquest of neighboring regions as
a pre-condition for trade.
Songhai. The Songhai Empire, with its capital at Gao, took advantage of a weakened
Mali to become free from Malinke control in 1340. Levzion (1975) only links this weak-
ness to trade conditions in a roundabout way, noting that Mali power in Timbuktu was
dislodged by first Mossi and later Tuareg raids. Gao was captured by Moroccan forces in
1591, after which the empire fractured. Levzion (1975) attributes Songhai weakness at
this point to a divisive civil war, and not to trade factors. It is clear that the empire de-
pended for its wealth on the trans-Saharan trade. Neumark (1977) explains the success,
not only of Songhay but of the states that preceded it, using “their strategic commercial
position on the fringes of the Sahara.” Songhay exported principally gold and slaves, as
well as ivory, rhinoceros horns, ostrich feathers, skins, ebony, civet, malaguetta pepper,
and semi-precious stones. It re-exported cloth and leather goods from Hausaland and
kola from the forest zone. It imported salt, linen, silk, cotton cloth, copper utensils and
tools, ironwork, paper, books, weapons, cowries, beads, mirrors, dates, figs, sugar, cattle
and horses. Leo Africanus noted the empire’s prosperity, as abundant food could be pro-
duced in the southern savanna and shipped to Timbuktu via the Niger (Levzion, 1975).
Lovejoy (1978), similarly, notes that Timbuktu and Gao, Songhay’s most important cities
“controlled trans-Saharan trade, desert-side exchange, and river traffic on the Niger. Lo-
cated in the Sahil but with easy access to western and central savanna, they were at the
hub of overland and river routes where staples of desert-side trade such as grain and salt
could readily be transferred from river boat to camel, and vice versa.” Songhay was the
first Sudanic empire whose power reached as far as the salt mines of Taghaza (Levzion,
1975). Shillington (1989) notes taxes on trade as a key source of government revenue.
It is true that, after its establishment, Songhay did expand – Bovill (1995) writes that
Songhay moved into the Hausa states to capture their quality land and into Air to drive
out Tuareg raiders. Levzion (1975) adds that these conquests were largely along the
Niger river, because of Songhay’s dependence on its Sorko fleet for its military power.
This is not necessarily counter to the Ricardian view. In the case of Air, this was a move-
ment to protect existing trade interests, not to secure new routes. The strength of Song-
hay, like many of the states that came before it, had already been based on its favorable
location for trade before it began its expansion.
Toro. One of Uganda’s four traditional kingdoms, Toro broke free of Bunyoro in 1830,
was reconquered in 1876, and became independent once again with Lugard’s help in
1891. The base of economic production in Toro was hoe-cultivation of finger-millet,
plantains, sweet potatoes and beans, though a cattle-keeping class existed (Taylor, 1962).
Under Bunyoro control, the territory produced iron goods and salt for sale within the
interlacustrine region (Ingham, 1975). This shaped the revenues of subordinate states;
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the Babito chief of Kisaka introduced agents to collect tax from both salt producers and
traders, a portion of which was sent to Bunyoro (Ingham, 1975). Trade was a source of
revenue to the state, both through tribute collection and direct control. Taylor (1962)
states that the king, chiefs and lords of Toro maintained control over land, cattle, lakes,
salt lakes, medicinal springs, canoe services, and “certain commodities having exchange
or prestige value,” such as tusks and lion skins. They collected many of these same goods
as tribute, as well as labor and military service, and reallocated them to relatives, chiefs,
officials and others. Gluckman further suggests that the “distribution of goods and ser-
vices” was mainly through kinship and feudal systems, though barter was also present.
Ingham (1975) describes the Toro region as one of relative prosperity. The Toro kings
sold slaves, ivory and cows to Arab traders in return for guns and cloth (Taylor, 1962).
Independent Toro was also an exporter of salt; Good (1972) notes that, until 1923, the
okukama or Mukama (king) of Toro held personal ownership over the trade in salt from
Lake Katwe and other lake deposits near Kasenyi. This was sold for regional consump-
tion in Bunyoro, ocassionally as far east as Lake Victoria, in Rwanda and Tanzania, and
into the Congo perhaps fifty miles beyond the present border (Good, 1972). This was,
however, an example of a state expanding to take advantage of a tradable resource. Lake
Katwe was in Busongora, which had also seceded from Bunyoro, and which was an early
conquest by independent Toro (Good, 1972). Bunyoro recaptured the territory during
the 1880s.
Suku. The Suku are a petty state in the Congolese savanna, part of the Central African
“matrilineal belt.” They appear to have become independent from the Lunda empire
during the early nineteenth century by moving into vacant land east of the Kwango val-
ley (Kopytoff, 1965). This was precipitated by the collapse of Lunda rule over the region
as a whole (Kopytoff, 1964). Kopytoff (1965) writes that Suku participation in the rubber
trades of the nineteenth century and Second World War was “marginal,” and that these
periods were “the only ones when the Suku had any cash crops to sell. At present, the
region is both too poor and too far from the centers to export a commercially feasible
product of any kind.” Similarly, the Suku lacked a developed system of market places
and itinerant trade was “not at all developed” (Kopytoff, 1967). The Suku did, however,
participate as middlemen in the long-distance trade between the raffia and palm-oil
producers north and east of them and southern groups who traded directly with the Por-
tuguese (Kopytoff, 1967). They also purchased raw raffia for weaving into cloth, which
was exported to the southeast along with palm oil in return for shell money and Eu-
ropean goods, some of which were exported (Kopytoff, 1967). The Suku were known
for their wealth in shell money. The Suku MeniKongo (king) actively ruled over some
twenty or thirty villages around the capital, and administered the remainder of his king-
dom through regional chiefs. Kopytoff (1964) tells us that shell money was legal tender
in rendering tribute to chiefs, so the same logic as used by Law (1977) implies that direct
taxes were, indirectly, taxes on trade.
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Given that much of the Suku kingship terminology is Lunda, Kopytoff (1965) supposes
that Suku political organization (like that of the neighboring Yaka) is also Lunda in ori-
gin. Lunda dominated the upper Kasai basin from c. 1700 (Birmingham, 1976). Within
the empire’s territory lay both copper mines and salt, which were sources of both trade
and tribute (Birmingham, 1976). Slaves for export were collected through both war and
the tributary system of tax collection, and this revenue allowed the royal court to judi-
ciously distribute the trade goods over which it held a virtual monopoly (Birmingham,
1976). The Suku inherited state forms from their trading predecessor, and prospered
from their position as middlemen.
Luba. The separate Luba states were not unified until the eighteenth century (Birm-
ingham, 1976). Before this period, separate Luba states such as Kikonja or Songye had
control of localized dired fish, salt, oil palm, raffia cloth, and copper-working industries
(Birmingham, 1976). Trade was largely “vertical,” collected by chiefs as tribute, and no
class of “horizontal” traders exchanging goods between producers emerged before the
growth of the Luba empire. In the late eighteenth century, Luba Lomami responded
most vigorously to the new long distance trade in ivory and slaves (Birmingham, 1976).
Bisa traders exchanged cloth, beads and cattle for tusks that were sold subject to tax-
ation and supervision by either the royal household or by chiefs (Birmingham, 1976).
This trade was preceeded by “pioneering chiefs,” who advanced into new lands and ar-
ranged for the purchase of ivory while at the same time creating “a more or less perma-
nent Luba political superstructure” behind which the Bisa traders followed (Birming-
ham, 1976).
After 1780, the Luba expanded, first into the space between the Lualaba and Lake
Tanganyika, and later into the fishing and palm oil areas of the Lalaba lakes, the cop-
per production portions of the Samba, and the ivory-producing province of Manyema
(Birmingham, 1976). At its peak in the mid-nineteenth century, the empire presided
over “a wide-ranging and international trade” in oil, salt, poisons, drums, slaves, copper,
palm cloth, baskets, iron, skins and fish. Wilson (1972) argues that long-distance trade
was the cause of this expansion. The slave trade pushed Lunda to establish Kazembe as
a tributary kingdom. Sub-regional specializations, such as Sanga production of copper
crosses, was stimulated by the influx of trade goods. Luba-Lomami itself began as a pro-
ducer of salt and hoes, sold in neighboring regions. New trades developed in response
to trade goods; for example, the traditional trade with the Holoholo was supplemented
with beads and ivory. Birmingham (1976) argues that the decline of the Luba kingdom
followed that of the ivory trade. Their Yeke-Nyamwezi trading partners began to focus
on copper, conquering production centers belonging to Mpande and Katanga. Swahili-
Arab traders began to trade directly into the forest, cutting out the Luba. With ivory be-
coming scarce and the price of slaves declining, the Luba were unable to purchase the
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guns needed to secure their power without exporting large numbers of internally cap-
tured slaves. The kingdom disintegrated into warring factions and became dominated
by its neighbors.
Lozi. The pastoral Lozi (or Barotse) have occupied a Zambezi floodplain since roughly
1600 (Gluckman, 1941), and have had a centralized king since at least the early nine-
teenth century (Birmingham, 1976). Trade within Lozi territory was in the specialized
products of each region – bulrush millet and cassava meal, wood products and iron
were brought in from the bush, and the Zambezi facilitated transport (Gluckman, 1941).
Gluckman suggests that Lozi strength was facilitated by the society’s internal cohesion,
stemming from royal control of the most productive farming mounds and a need to pro-
tect cattle during the flood season. Further, the king and princess chief both collected
tribute in the specialized production of the “tribes” under their command, including ca-
noes, weapons, iron tools, meat, fish, fruit, salt, honey, maize and manioc (Birmingham,
1976).
The Lozi were ruled between 1840 and 1864 by the Sotho-speaking Kololo. The Lozi
spurned Lovale traders before the emergence of the trade in slaves and ivory in southern
Kololo around 1850. Before this, they had sent traders to the Lunda areas of the upper
Zambezi, trading indirectly with the Portuguese (Flint, 1970). Flint (1970) suggests that
the major change was the rise of the ivory trade. By 1860, long distance trade had be-
come of major importance to the Barotse. The Kololo obtained ivory as tribute from
the Barotse and by selling iron hoes to the Tonga. The Lozi also exported cattle and for-
est products in return for trade goods (Gluckman, 1941). Trade strengthened the Kololo
king against other chiefs who depended on cattle raiding for revenue. He worked to es-
tablish new ‘caravan chiefs’ (Flint, 1970). Flint (1970) suggests that the trade-oriented
Barotse clashed with the Kololo, whose raids disrupted trade, and who refused to move
the capital closer to the trade routes. Further, the king kept his profits from ivory within
his court. Though the details are not clear, Birmingham (1976) notes that traders op-
erated independently of the state, the argues the western ivory trade “may have facil-
itated” the restoration of a Lozi king during the 1870s. Gluckman (1941) suggests that
the restored king traded cattle, ivory and slaves on his own account for trade goods that
he distributed, both among his own people and among subject tribes.
In return for the surplus states extracted from trade, subjects received greater peace
and traders were protected. Taylor (1962, p 60) writes that the Toro “expected patron-
age - protection, justice, undisturbed occupation of their land, and rewards especially
in stock or chieftainships or honours for good service.” Among the Lozi, the political au-
thorities re-distributed tribute, sometimes to those in need, serving as what Gluckman
(1941, p. 73) calls a “clearing house.” Traders were willing to render gifts to the king, “for
they traveled by his permission and largely, despite their muskets, under his protection
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(p. 78).” Lewanika, for example, sent a punitive expedition against subject Ila for hav-
ing killed a party of traders (p. 79). Oyo caravans, similarly, often traveled under cavalry
protection (Law, 1975).
Overall, these are consistent with the Ricardian view that trade give rise to states.
Songhai and Oyo expanded to capture more territory, but did so after having arisen in
locations favorable to trade. The Luba expanded after 1780 based on power already ac-
quired through the Bisa ivory trade. When that trade declined, the kingdom collapsed.
The pre-Kololo Lozi dominance over surrounding peoples depended in part on the abil-
ity to trade and collect tribute in the diverse products of their neighbors. That the Suku
participated in long-distance trade while possessing only limited internal markets high-
lights the importance trade in products of different macro-ecological regions. In every
case, rulers relied on taxing trade. Though Toro conquered Busongora in part to capture
the most important source of salt in the region, it inherited its political structure from
Bunyoro, which had previously grown strong in part due to its sale of metal goods and
control of the Kibiro salt industry.
My third strategy for dismissing this alternative explanation is to control directly for
area. This is not done in the main analysis, because it is potentially endogenous. States
that independently develop strong states might have larger areas, biasing the coefficient
on both area and potentially on the other coefficients. This is also why the other “addi-
tional controls” in Table 10 are not in the main specification. With this caveat in mind,
if it is only through expansion that states become correlated with ecological diversity,
there should be no correlation conditional on area. I include it, then, as an additional
regressor in Table 8. The impact of area is negligible, and the coefficient remains signif-
icant, positive, and of a similar magnitude.
5.3. Islands of quality. The third alternative story is that states emerge to protect “is-
lands” of particular quality. This competition is fiercest when these islands are very dif-
ferent from neighboring areas, and areas with diverse land qualities will similarly have
diverse ecologies. Jones (2003, p. 105-106), similarly, argues that the European patch-
work of nation states (as opposed to China’s unifying empire) was based on the preva-
lence of fertile islands separated by natural boundaries. This is also much like Allen’s
(1997) view that the Egyptian state benefitted from the fact that its citizens were con-
fined to a fertile valley surrounded by desert. Carneiro (1970), likewise, has noted that
the Nile, Tigrus-Euphrates, and Indus valleys as well as the Valley of Mexico and the
mountain and coastal valleys of Peru were all areas of circumscribed agricultural land.
In Table 10 I control for the range of agricultural constraints – the difference in land
quality between the best and worst points in a society’s territory. This does diminish the
effect of ecological diversity, though it remains significant.
5.4. Populationdensity. Fourth, it is possible that ecological diversity is correlated with
population density, which alone explains the centralization of pre-colonial African states.
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I add population density in 1960, published by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, as a proxy for historical population density.19 This is reported in Table 10, and
the effect of ecological diversity remains intact. There is indeed a positive correlation
between ecological diversity and this proxy for population density, both unconditional
and conditional on the main controls, but once standard errors are clustered by ethno-
graphic region, this effect is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels (not
reported).
5.5. Ethnic competition. Fifth, it is possible, combining the stories of Michalopoulos
(2008) and Tilly and Ardant (1975), that ecology-specific human capital gives rise to a
greater number of ethnic groups in regions of diverse ecology, and that competition be-
tween these groups leads to greater state centralization. To show that this is not driving
my results, I return to my sample of artificial countries. For each square, I count the
number of ethnic groups that intersect it in Murdock’s map, and include this as an ad-
ditional control in Table 10. This does not do away with the direct effect of ecological
diversity on states in columns 5 or 6, suggesting that this and the gains-from-trade ex-
planation of states are not mutually exclusive.
5.6. Grain endemism. It may also be that ecological diversity promotes state forma-
tion not through trade, but through increasing the number of activities a society may
rely on to cope with risk and seasonal variation. For transhumants, this meant that ani-
mals could be moved throughout the year to take advantage of seasonal food resources
and to avoid diseases (Beinart, 2007). I have already shown in Table 5 that the results
are not, however, driven by the presence of societies dependant on animal husbandry
in the data. Results are also robust to including the presence of bovines as a control
(not reported). For agricultural societies, being able to cultivate a diverse set of grains
may enable a state to better cope with heterogeneity across space and with climatic
risk (e.g. McCann (1999) on Ethiopia). To the extent that these different grains serve as
insurance through intra-regional trade, this is not inconsistent with an interpretation
linking diversity to states through trade. I show in Table 10 that including a measure of
grain endemicity does not do away with the results. In particular, I use plate 48 from the
FAO-GAEZ to compute the share of each ethnic group’s territory that is most suitable for
each of the grains they list. I then construct a Herfindahl index out of these shares as a
measure of endemicity.
6. MECHANISMS
6.1. How does trade cause states? In the previous two sections, I have attempted to
show that the relationship between ecological diversity and states is robust, and that it
is best explained by trade. Even if that is established, there are many reasons centralized
states might arise due to gains from trade. The ability of rulers to tax exchange and to
19Raster data taken from http://na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php.
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trade on their own was highlighted by the case studies in the previous section. Similarly,
states may become a worthwhile means of reducing feuds when the gains from trade are
high. Many of these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and the data do not permit
all of these to be tested. Even so, I use this section to evaluate the empirical support
for several possible channels linking trade and states through ecological diversity. I find
that ecological diversity is strongly associated with class stratification, but not with local
political structures or religion. Trade in the SCCS is related with a wide selection of state
functions, rather than a few narrow indicators of state capacity.
In Table 11, I test whether the Ethnographic Atlas supports any of the mechanisms
suggested above. The first possible mechanism is to take over the authority of other
smaller states in its vicinity. The atlas contains a variable (V32) that records the number
of “levels of local jurisdiction.” Following Bolt and Smits (2010), I take this as a crude
measure of the strength of local states, and use it as an outcome in place of state cen-
tralization in (2). While there is a suggestive negative correlation between ecological
diversity and local states when no other controls are added, this is not robust to the
inclusion of other variables. Similarly, V72 records the rules for succession to the of-
fice of the local headman. I construct a “headman is appointed” dummy if this rule is
“appointment by higher authority.” There appears to be no correlation in the data. I am
not able to directly test for the spread of Islam as a mechanism by which trade promoted
states. The data only state whether high gods are “supportive of human morality”, which
is only positive for a handful of societies outside of the Moslem Sudan, Western Sudan
and Ethiopia. This is only available for a sample roughly half the size of the main sample,
and does not appear to be related to ecological diversity in Table 11.
Another possible mechanism for the rise of states is the ability of kings to amass
wealth through taxation, letting them gain prestige and control the flow of tribute. To
test for this mechanism, I use V66, “class stratification among freemen,” which is divided
into five levels. In order, these are “absence among freemen,” “wealth distinctions,”
“elite,” “dual,” and “complex.” Ecological diversity positively predicts this in Table 11.
Results (not reported) are similar if a binary class stratification measure is used. I am
wary to overinterpret this result; the existence of a state may imply the presence of a
ruling class by construction. I am, in fact, unable to rule out the alternative hypothesis
that diverse ecology facilitates occupational specialization and, hence, it is inequality
unrelated to trade that gives rise to states. Because class and states are very strongly
correlated (p < 0.0000), I cannot separate out these effects. Despite this caveat, there
does appear to be a strong relationship between trade and inequality. Recent mod-
els that allow globalization to raise wage dispersion do not help interpret this corre-
lation. These stress increases in the incomes of relatively abundant factors, productiv-
ity increases in exporting industries that increase skill premia, and search frictions in
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unskilled-intensive import-competing sectors (Harrison et al., 2011). These are of lim-
ited relevance to pre-industrial societies. Instead, rulers’ access to prestige goods and to
additional tax revenues are much more likely mechanisms.
Similarly, I test whether there is a relationship between gains from trade and one par-
ticular form of inequality – slavery. V70 codes slavery into four levels. These are “ab-
sence or near absence,” “incipient or nonhereditary,” “reported but type not identified,”
and “hereditary and socially significant.” There is a positive correlation of ecological
diversity and slavery conditional on other controls. I am wary again to over-interpret
this, as not apparent in the unconditional correlation, but it does further support a link
between trade and inequality.
While the sample of African societies in the SCCS is too small to use for comparing
that source’s data on trade with the main sample here, I can test whether the various
measures of state centralization in the SCCS’s global sample are correlated with any of
the forms of trade mentioned in that data source. In the appendix, I report the signifi-
cance of the estimated coefficient from a regression of the listed measure of statehood
on the listed measure of trade and a constant. Interestingly, trade in food and the im-
portance of trade in subsistence are related with the greatest number of state-related
outcomes. The degree of police specialization (v90) and the level of the highest political
office (v1740) are correlated with all the trade measures. The degree to which the exec-
utive is concentrated in a single person (v85), the presence of a judiciary (recoded v89)
and the level of highest overarching jurisdiction (v1741) are correlated with all but one.
In sum, many types of trade are related to several state-related outcomes in the SCCS –
no one type of trade appears to operate through one specific mechanism.20
6.2. What sort of trade matters? While the ecological diversity measure serves as a
proxy for the capacity to trade products from different ecological zones, it will not cap-
ture other forms of trade. In Table 12, I test whether other sources of trade – fishing, iron,
gold, salt and historical trade routes – give similar rise to states. A society’s percentage
20Other outcomes of ecological diversity may be of interest to the reader. Ecological diversity variable
does predict modern economic activity, though not robustly. I use the same ln(1+Avg. light density) nor-
malization of 2009 nighttime lights as Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) to test this. The ecological
diversity measure predicts conditional, though not unconditional, differences in modern light densities.
This effect disappears, however, when standard errors are clustered by ethnographic regions. I am wary
to interpret area as a measure of state strength, and it is likely that any correlation between ecological
diversity and territorial scope is due to reverse causation. Ecological diversity does, for the interested
reader, predict area in an OLS regression, and this is robust to both the standard controls and regional
fixed effects (not reported). I have found no relationship between ecological diversity and urbanization
measured by cities in 1850 reported by Chandler and Fox (1974) (also not reported).
Similarly, some readers may be interested in how ecological diversity and pre-colonial states relate to
colonial outcomes. I show in the appendix that ethnic groups whose largest slice of territory was con-
quered by Britain were generally more diverse and more centralized than those captured by France, but
less than those not colonized. Within the British empire, Frankema and van Waijenburg (2010) have
found early twentieth century real wages were much higher in West Africa than East Africa. If there is
any pattern apparent, it is that ethnic groups in Britain’s East African conquests were more diverse and
centralized than those in Ghana and Nigeria, though Sierra Leone forms an exception.
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dependance on fishing is V3 in the Ethnographic Atlas. I find no correlation between
this and states. While it is possible that the impact of fishing is being hidden by the
impacts of other controls (notably coastal distance and major rivers), regressing states
on the fishing variable alone similarly does not yield a significant result (not reported).
To test the importance of minerals, I take data from the US Geological Service’s Min-
eral Resources Program.21 These records contain data on both metallic and nonmetal-
lic mineral resources at specific sites, with their latitudes and longitudes. “Iron” is the
number of sites of iron production found within an ethnic group’s territory, and “gold”
is analogously defined. If there is likely to be any endogeneity bias from using modern
data, it will be positive, since modern states that have inherited the strength of their
pre-colonial predecessors will likely be better able to exploit their countries’ resources.
Despite this, I find no evidence that iron matters.22 Gold enters significantly when no
controls are added, though the effect of gold is marginally insignificant with controls.
“Salt” is the number of salt-producing cites listed by Sundstro¨m (1974) within an ethnic
group’s territory.23 The presence of historical trade routes (taken from Michalopoulos
et al. (2010)) are strongly related with state centralization.
I can also test whether state centralization is correlated with any particular form of
trade in the SCCS’s global sample of ethnic groups. In the appendix, I present the re-
sults of regressing several of these indicators on the state centralization measure and
a constant. Societies with states are more likely to trade for food, through more levels
of intermediation, and that this trade is more important to their subsistence. Political
power is more likely to depend on commerce in more centralized states, trade and mar-
kets are more likely to exist, and exchange is more important both within and beyond
the community, though this latter correlation is not significant at conventional levels.
Interestingly, this suggests that it is more mundane, intra-community trade in products
such as food, rather than long distance trade in products such as gold and ivory, that
matters for the formation of states. The main data sources here do not allow for these
two types of trade to be conclusively tested against each other. However, the “ecological
diversity” measure is more intuitively related to trade that is possible within an ethnic
group’s borders, while the “distance from an ecological divide” variable is more sugges-
tive of long distance trade. In the appendix, I test whether the estimated effect of either
one disappears when both are included as regressors. They are, however, strongly cor-
related, which limits the power of this test. With controls, both coefficients fall relatively
40% relative to their values in Tables 2 and Table 3. It is not, then, possible to rule out
the importance of either long distance or local trade.
21The data are available at http://mrdata.usgs.gov/
22I similarly find no result if I use the number of iron-producing sites within a group’s territory listed by
Sundstro¨m (1974) as a measure of iron.
23Of 271 sites he lists, I match 84 to ethnic groups in the data and 157 to specific geographic locations, such
as Cape Lopez. For 30 I could not find a match. The full table of matches is given in the Web Appendix.
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6.3. Is Africa different? In other work, I have assembled an analogous geographic data-
set for all 1,267 societies of the Ethnographic Atlas.24 While some of the controls used
here are either not available outside of Africa or computed somewhat differently in that
data, I am able to expand the present analysis to the whole world. Results in Table 13
suggest that Africa is not different: in a sample of more than 1,000 societies from around
the world, ecological diversity continues to predict the existence of states. This is true
even as the sub-Saharan societies are dropped from the analysis, and coefficient mag-
nitudes remain similar.
7. CONCLUSION
I have used this paper to provide empirical support for Bates’s (1983) Ricardian view
of pre-colonial African states. The gains from trade stemming from ecological diver-
sity predict the presence of state centralization across sub-Saharan societies recorded
in the Ethnographic Atlas. Moving from a homogenous zone to one that is ecologically
diverse predicts that the chance a society is centralized rises between 11 and 13 per-
centage points. Distance from an ecological divide serves as well in predicting states.
There is no evidence this is overstated due to endogeneity, outliers or specific ethno-
graphic regions. The histories of African societies are consistent with this interpretation
of the data, rather than one in which states emerge and then migrate. Similarly, area,
defense of fertile islands, correlation with dense population, and ethnic competition do
not explain the results. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) show that the strength
of pre-colonial African states does more to predict modern development, using night-
time lights as a measure, than country-level institutions. These states are rooted in the
intersection of ecology and trade.
It is now a common narrative that geography shapes institutions, and that institutions
drive development (e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2001); Engerman and Sokoloff (2002)). I have
highlighted a means by which geographic endowments give rise to states. What does
this result add to our understanding of the link between institutions and development
in the present? First, it suggests that other findings interpreted as culture may operate
through institutions. The result in Durante (2009) that historical with mutual insur-
ance leads to greater levels of trust may arise through the institutional consequences of
mutually-insuring trade. Second, institutions have heterogeneous effects on develop-
ment, and part of this heterogeneity is both path-dependent and context-specific. The
way that pre-colonial states formed and evolved in Africa is likely to continue to shape
development over and above what remnants exist of these polities today. The legacy of
states is also one of ecologically-driven trade.
24This has been created for The Author (2011). Details are given in the web appendix.
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FIGURE 1. State centralization
Source: (Murdock, 1967). Darker regions have more centralized states.
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FIGURE 2. Vegetation types and ecological diversity
Source: White (1983). In the left-hand map of vegetation types, each shade of grey represents a different
one of each of the sixteen major types. In the right-hand side map of ecological diversity, darker regions
are more ecologically diverse
FIGURE 3. State centralization when ecological diversity is above and be-
low the median
The dark bars are for ecological diversity above the median, the light bars for ecological diversity below
it. Percentage is on the y axis and levels of jurisdiction on the x axis.
FIGURE 4. Kernel density of ecological diversity
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FIGURE 5. Ecological diversity and state centralization for artificial coun-
tries
Source: Murdock (1967) and White (1983). In the left-hand map of ecological diversity, darker regions
are more diverse. In the right-hand map of state centralization, darker regions are more centralized.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean s.d. Min Max N
State centralization 1.15 0.93 0 4 440
Any centralization 0.73 0.44 0 1 440
Local state 2.91 0.68 2 4 439
Class stratification 1.25 1.41 0 4 364
Slavery 1.83 1.03 0 3 383
Headman appointed 0.066 0.25 0 1 320
Light density 1.50 0.18 1.15 3.34 440
Ecological diversity 0.30 0.23 0 0.80 440
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.47 0.23 0 0.80 440
Predicted Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.20 0.21 0 0.70 440
Dist. ecological divide 0.45 0.53 0.019 2.95 440
Any diversity 0.78 0.42 0 1 440
Salt 0.42 0.88 0 6 440
Gold production 0.34 1.86 0 24 440
Iron production 0.12 0.33 0 1 440
% dep. on fishing 8.32 10.9 0 70 440
Major river 0.23 0.42 0 1 440
Ag. constraints 5.41 1.06 2.94 8.92 440
Dist. coast 5.54 3.76 0 14.9 440
Elevation 728 520 -7.41 2,308 440
Malaria 0.83 0.27 0 1 440
Precipitation 1,194 528 32.4 2,954 440
Ruggedness 71,792 70,413 0 421,381 440
Temperature 8,882 1,112 5,295 10,699 440
Dist. L. Victoria 2,198 1,438 131 5,708 440
Date observed 1,919 21.6 1,830 1,960 440
Dist. Atlantic ST 6,688 1,515 3,671 9,949 440
Dist. Indian ST 4,546 1,589 1,028 7,953 440
Dist. Saharan ST 3,333 975 806 6,999 440
Dist. Red ST 2,887 1,360 107 5,773 440
Crop: None 0.025 0.16 0 1 440
Crop: Trees 0.084 0.28 0 1 440
Crop: Roots/tubers 0.19 0.39 0 1 440
Temperature s.d. 294 292 0 1,635 370
Area 2.43 3.64 8.2e-06 27.0 440
Pop. density 22.2 28.5 0 311 440
Ag. Constraints Range 4.66 1.95 0 9 440
Grain endemicity 0.35 0.25 0 0.76 425
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Outcomes
Gains from trade
Controls
Other variables used
Ecological diversity
Other controls
Observations
Continuous Above median Continuous Above median
0 levels -0.259*** -0.108*** -0.220*** -0.089***
(0.087) (0.033) (0.069) (0.024)
1 level -0.022 -0.009 -0.024 -0.010
(0.038) (0.016) (0.029) (0.012)
2 levels 0.152*** 0.063*** 0.149*** 0.060***
(0.052) (0.019) (0.050) (0.018)
3 levels 0.118*** 0.050*** 0.091*** 0.037***
(0.044) (0.018) (0.034) (0.013)
4 levels 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Table 2. Main Results
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics. Coefficient
estimates where ecological diversity is replaced with an "above median" indicator are not reported.
Marginal effects
0.794***
(0.266)
No
440
Yes
440
0.703***
(0.234)
(1) (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any cent. Cent. > 1
Ecological diversity 0.280** 0.254***
(0.128) (0.095)
Dist. ecological divide -0.301***
(0.071)
Any diversity 0.359**
(0.142)
Ecological diversity (Simpler classes) 0.793**
(0.311)
Ecological diversity (High density areas) 0.625***
(0.203)
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.998***
(0.282)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
(1)
Ecological diversity
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Other controls
Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed
as "controls" in the table of summary statistics. † In the generalized ordered probit, convergence could not be achieved with ruggedness or Red Sea slave
trade distance included, so these are dropped as controls.
0.506**
(0.257)
Yes
440
0.693***
(0.238)
Yes
440
(0.470)
0.794***
(0.249)
0.823**
(0.415)
-24.830**
(10.910)
Yes†
440
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, except with "any centralization" as the outcome, in which case probit is
used with marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
Table 3. Robustness: Alternative measures of states and diversity
(2) (3)
Table 4. Robustness: Estimation methods
Generalized ordered probit  No "trade" controls No date control
State centralization
0.930**
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropped
High 
leverage High dfbeta
South 
African 
Bantu
Ethiopia 
and Horn
Moslem 
Sudan
Indian 
Ocean
Ecological diversity 0.642** 0.958*** 0.735*** 0.752*** 0.611** 0.768***
(0.286) (0.289) (0.228) (0.233) (0.238) (0.226)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 406 411 421 400 417 435
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dropped
Not mostly 
agric. Non-agric.
Mostly 
husbandry
Mostly 
desert Any desert
High ag. 
constr.
Ecological diversity 0.646*** 0.729*** 0.686*** 0.681*** 0.737*** 0.602**
(0.250) (0.236) (0.252) (0.238) (0.240) (0.267)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 378 429 402 437 432 392
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS
OLS: Temp. 
s.d. not 
missing
Ordered 
probit
Ecological diversity 0.542*** 0.612*** 1.597** 1.021
(0.163) (0.190) (0.716) (2.709)
Temperature s.d./1000 0.490** 0.124
(0.245) (0.316)
Predicted Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.271*
(0.143)
Other controls Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 440 370 370 370 370 370 440
KP LM 5.372 2.763
KP F 29.74 8.759
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table
of summary statistics.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by
region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
Table 6. Robustness: Reverse causation
State centralization
State centralization
Table 5. Robustness Influential observations
IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Including 
area shares
Latitude 
longitude 
cubic
 Spatially 
correlated 
errors  Spatial lag Conley's OLS
 Including 
neighbors' X
Interactions 
with de-
meaned 
controls
Ecological diversity 0.972*** 0.672*** 0.491** 0.515** 0.542*** 0.573*** 0.729***
(0.271) (0.201) (0.216) (0.201) (0.040) (0.193) (0.258)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Wald test (λ=0) 1.280
Wald test (ρ=0) 4.476
WX p 0
Moran p 0.290
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Nearest 
neighbor 
matching
Altonji-Elder-
Taber 
Statistic
Ethno. 
region F.E.
UN region 
F.E. Country F.E.
Lang. family 
F.E.
Ecological diversity 0.437** 0.661*** 0.426** 0.463**
(0.219) (0.239) (0.211) (0.206)
Above Median Diversity SATE 0.202**
(0.096)
Altonji-Elder-Taber Statistic 4.52
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes†
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, excepting the spatial estimators as
noted in the text. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region, excepting spatial estimators as noted in the text. Other controls are
those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics. Convergence could not be achieved with all crop type dummies and language
family fixed effects, and so tuber and tree crop dummies are excluded from this column.
State centralization
State centralization
Table 7. Robustness: Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Artificial 1x1 
countries (max 
state)
State centralization: 
Artificial 1x1 
countries (median 
state)
 Artificial 2x2 
countries (max 
state) Drop Area Q1 Drop Area Q5 
Drop Area Q1 and 
Q5
Ecological diversity 0.590*** 0.430** 0.526* 0.914*** 0.665*** 1.017***
(0.102) (0.180) (0.282) (0.269) (0.255) (0.268)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1523 1516 449 440 440 440
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Name Cent. dfbeta Name Cent. dfbeta
Songhai 3 0.182 Barea 0 0.122
Yoruba 3 0.170 Shuwa 2 0.113
Chiga 0 0.155 Luba 3 0.111
Lozi 3 0.149 Kunama 0 0.107
Bagirmi 3 0.148 Rundi 3 0.093
Toro 3 0.145 Fur 3 0.089
Laketonga 0 0.138 Suku 3 0.085
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 Yoruba  Songhai  Toro  Suku  Luba  Lozi
Participated in trade?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trade a source of wealth?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Arguable  Yes  Yes
Trade a source of state power?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Rose and fall with trade?  Arguable  No  No  No  Yes  Arguable 
No capture of trading regions?  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
These summarize the results of the case studies described in the text.
Table 9. Alternative stories: Six influential states
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls
are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
Table 8. Alternative stories: Artificial countries and area groups
State centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(max state) (median state)
Ecological diversity 0.673*** 0.535** 0.682*** 0.703*** 0.547*** 0.457***
(0.228) (0.259) (0.230) (0.230) (0.105) (0.168)
Area 0.021
(0.022)
Ag. Constraints Range 0.065*
(0.035)
Pop. density 0.001
(0.001)
Grain endemism 0.287
(0.403)
No. of Ethnic Groups 0.116*** -0.063*
(0.041) (0.036)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 1523 1516
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local state
Class 
Stratification Slavery
Headman is 
appointed High gods Light density
Ecological diversity -0.207 1.474*** 0.554*** -0.085 -0.267 0.088
(0.238) (0.230) (0.137) (0.633) (0.910) (0.086)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 439 364 383 320 242 440
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
Table 10. Alternative stories: Additional controls and ethnic competition
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
Table 11. Mechanisms: Other institutional outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% dep. on fishing 0.003
(0.004)
Iron production 0.047
(0.165)
Gold production 0.020
(0.016)
Salt 0.037
(0.052)
Hist. trade route 0.549***
(0.159)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440
Ecological diversity (FAO)
Other controls
Observations
 Excluding sub-Saharan 
Africa
0.892***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in
parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are land quality, distance from coast,
elevation, malaria, rainfall, temperature, date, crop dummies, major river, ruggedness and
absolute latitude.
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table
of summary statistics.
State centralization
Table 12. Mechanisms: Other sources of trade
Table 13. Mechanisms: Is Africa different?
(0.198)
Yes
1076
0.701***
(0.232)
Yes
636
(1)
Whole world
(2)
Appendix
(1) (2) (3)
  Abuts ecological divide  Diversified area  No ecological variation  
Kinship 12% 17% 40%
Chiefs 38% 50% 20%
Central monarch 50% 33% 40%
N 8 6 20
Absent 25% 40% 67%
Present 75% 60% 33%
N 8 5 18
Absent 38% 40% 50%
Present 62% 60% 50%
N 8 5 20
Local level 62% 40% 50%
Regional level 0% 20% 10%
National level 38% 40% 40%
N 8 5 20
Notes: Adapted from Bates (1983), p. 43.
Table A1. Bates' evidence
Political structure 
Central bureaucracy 
National army 
Army commanded at 
Ecological diversity 0.794*** (0.266) 0.703*** (0.234)
Ag. constraints -0.018 (0.059)
Dist. coast 0.024 (0.026)
Elevation 0.000 (0.000)
Malaria -0.501 (0.306)
Precipitation 0.000 (0.000)
Temperature -0.000 (0.000)
Dist. L. Victoria 0.000 (0.000)
Date observed -0.003** (0.002)
Crop: None -1.558** (0.772)
Crop: Trees 0.136 (0.325)
Crop: Roots/tubers 0.456** (0.203)
Major river 0.268* (0.155)
Ruggedness 0.000 (0.000)
Dist. Atlantic ST 0.000 (0.000)
Dist. Indian ST -0.001 (0.000)
Dist. Saharan ST -0.001 (0.001)
Dist. Red ST 0.001 (0.001)
Observations 440 440
Table A2. Full results
(1) (2)
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard 
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable    Coef s.e. N
v81: Political autonomy 0.485 0.082 182
v82: Trend in political autonomy 0.395 0.069 182
v84: Higher political organization 0.400 0.071 181
v85: Executive 0.801 0.086 181
v89: Judiciary 0.261 0.022 181
v90: Police 0.889 0.080 178
v91: Administrative hierarchy 0.943 0.071 181
v700: State punishes crimes against persons 0.185 0.033 91
v701: Full-time bureaucrats 0.242 0.026 91
v702: Part of kingdom 0.136 0.029 86
v756: Political role specialization 1.220 0.167 89
v759: Leaders' perceived power 0.432 0.069 89
v760: Leaders' perceived capriciousness 0.240 0.097 66
v761: Leaders' unchecked power 0.385 0.076 85
v762: Inability to remove leaders 0.420 0.100 77
v763: Leaders' independence 0.426 0.070 86
v764: Leaders' control of decisions 0.584 0.136 87
v776: Formal sanctions and enforcement 0.412 0.068 89
v777: Enforcement specialists 0.461 0.076 88
v779: Loyalty to the wider society 0.228 0.104 83
v784: Taxation 0.536 0.069 84
v785: Rareness of political fission 0.154 0.102 64
v1132: Political integration 1.185 0.070 118
v1134: Despotism in dispute resolution 0.132 0.023 104
v1135: Jurisdictional perquisites 0.172 0.067 34
v1736: Tribute, Taxation, Expropriation 0.961 0.152 77
v1740: Levels of political hierarchy 1.600 0.196 100
v1741: Overarching jurisdiction 0.331 0.070 94
v1742: Selection of lower officials 0.524 0.061 95
Table A3. Regressions of alternative SCCS measures of states on state centralization
Each row reports the estimated coefficient and standard error when the listed variable in the SCCS is regressed on state 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
v1: Trade for 
food
v2: Food trade 
intermediation
v93: Political 
power via 
commerce
v732: 
Importance of 
trade in 
subsistence
v1007: Trade 
and markets
v1733: 
Exchange within 
community
v1734: 
Exchange 
beyond 
community
v81: Political autonomy ** **
v82: Trend in political autonomy *** *** *** ** **
v84: Higher political organization ** * ***
v85: Executive *** * *** ** ** *
v89: Judiciary *** *** *** ** ** *
v90: Police *** *** *** ** ** * **
v91: Administrative hierarchy *** ** *** ** ***
v700: State punishes crimes against persons ** *** *** **
v701: Full-time bureaucrats *** ** ***
v702: Part of kingdom ***
v756: Political role specialization ** *
v759: Leaders' perceived power ** **
v760: Leaders' perceived capriciousness ** * *
v761: Leaders' unchecked power **
v762: Inability to remove leaders ** * *
v763: Leaders' independence * ** *
v764: Leaders' control of decisions **
v776: Formal sanctions and enforcement *** * **
v777: Enforcement specialists *
v779: Loyalty to the wider society **
v784: Taxation ** ** **
v785: Rareness of political fission
v1132: Political integration *** ** *** **
v1134: Despotism in dispute resolution *
v1135: Jurisdictional perquisites
v1736: Tribute, Taxation, Expropriation *** ** * ** ***
v1740: Levels of political hierarchy *** ** *** ** ** * *
v1741: Overarching jurisdiction *** * ** *** ** *
v1742: Selection of lower officials *** *** ** *
Table A4. Mechanisms: Trade and state-related outcomes in the SCCS
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Each row reports the significance of the estimated coefficient the listed "state" variable in the SCCS is regressed on the listed "trade" variable 
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable    Coef s.e. N
v1: Trade for food 0.324 0.071 181
v2: Food trade intermediation 0.289 0.087 123
v93: Political power via commerce 0.064 0.018 181
v732: Importance of trade in subsistence 0.154 0.056 92
v1007: Trade and markets 0.382 0.104 52
v1733: Exchange within community 0.200 0.096 95
v1734: Exchange beyond community 0.098 0.079 98
Table A5. Mechanisms: Regressions of SCCS measures of trade on state centralization
Each row reports the estimated coefficient and standard error when the listed variable in the SCCS is regressed on state 
(1) (2)
Ecological diversity State centralization
Ecological diversity 0.462
(0.341)
Dist. ecological divide -0.284*** -0.179
(0.016) (0.113)
Other controls Yes
Observations 440 440
R-squared 0.424
Table A6. Mechanisms: Local or long distance trade?
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Colonial Power
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. N
Belgium 0.26 0.24 1.08 0.92 50
Britain 0.31 0.23 1.13 0.93 202
Ethiopia 0.38 0.25 1.00 0.89 6
France 0.22 0.21 1.00 0.88 108
None 0.46 0.19 1.55 0.92 38
Portugal 0.24 0.21 1.10 0.72 20
South Africa 0.46 0.17 1.67 1.15 12
Spain 0.12 0.16 2.50 2.12 2
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Country
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. N
Botswana 0.57 0.09 1.00 1.41 2
Egypt 0.00 1.00 1
Ghana 0.15 0.22 0.94 1.00 18
Kenya 0.42 0.18 0.95 0.76 20
Malawi 0.42 0.04 1.50 0.71 2
Nigeria 0.16 0.21 1.02 0.93 60
Sierra Leone 0.39 0.25 1.67 0.58 3
Somalia 0.55 0.05 1.00 1.41 2
Sudan 0.42 0.18 0.87 0.76 31
Swaziland 0.45 3.00 1
Tanzania 0.44 0.18 1.25 0.94 36
Uganda 0.41 0.16 1.47 1.06 15
Zambia 0.25 0.22 1.64 0.92 11
Zimbabwe 0.19 0.27 2.50 0.71 2
Table A6. Colonial outcomes
Ecological diversity State centralization
Ecological diversity State centralization
Major river
This is a dummy that equals one if the Benue, Blue Nile, Chire, Congo, Lualaba, Lukaga,
Niger, Nile, Orange, Ubangi, White Nile, or Zambezi Rivers intersect the ethnic group's
territory.
Ag. constraints
This is an index of combined climate, soil and terrain slope constrains on rain-fed
agriculture, taken from the FAO-GAEZ project (see Fischer et al. (2001)). I interpret it as an
inverse measure of land quality.
Dist. coast
This is average distance from each point in the ethnic group territory to the nearest point on
the coast, in decimal degrees, calculated in ArcMap.
Elevation  This is average elevation in meters.
Malaria
This is average climatic suitability for malaria transmission, computed by Adjuik et al.
(1998).
Precipitation
This is average annual precipitation (mm). Because some societies are too small for a raster
point to fall within their territory, I impute missing data using the nearest raster point.
Ruggedness
This is a measure of terrain ruggedness used by Nunn and Puga (2009). It computes the
average absolute difference in elevation between a grid cell and that of its neighbors.
Temperature
This is the accumulated temperature on days with mean daily temperature above 0 degrees
celsius, computed using monthly data from 1961 to 2000 collected by the Climate Research
Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia. I treat 55537 is as an error code and drop these
points. I impute missing values using the nearest raster point.
Dist. L. Victoria
I compute the distance between each ethnic group's centroid and that of Lake Victoria using
the globdist function in Stata.
Date observed 
This is the rough date at which the information on the society was recorded, according to the
Ethnographic Atlas . Dates of observation are missing for the Bomvana and Betsileo. I
recode the Bomvana to 1850, to match the date of observation for the other Xhosa. I recode
the Betsileo to 1900, the modal date for the other Malagasy societies in the data.
Dist. Atlantic ST 
This is the minimum distance between the ethnic group's centroid and the nearest major
source of new world demand for slaves (Virginia, Havana, Haiti, Kingston, Dominica,
Martinique, Guyana, Salvador, or Rio), computed using the globdist function in Stata. The
choice of ports here follows Nunn (2008).
Dist. Indian ST  This is, similarly, the distance to the nearest of Mauritius and Muscat.
Dist Saharan ST This is the minimum distance to Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi, or Cairo.
Dist Red ST  This is the minimum distance to Mussawa, Suakin, or Djibouti.
Crop type
I construct dummy variables out of the major crop types recorded in the Ethnographic 
Atlas.  I treat these as exogenous characteristics determined by the natural environment.
Control Variables
